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The Islamic Republic’s Fourth Economic, Social and Cul-tural Development Plan (2004/5-2009/10) came to its unceremoni-
ous end on March 21, 2010.1 This was to 
be the first of a four-plan scenario within 
Iran’s ambitious Twenty-year Economic 
Perspective 2004-2024.  According to this 
perspective, by 2024, after the completion 
of four five-year plans, Iran was expected 
to be a fully advanced nation, ranking 
first among 28 Middle Eastern and South 
Asian countries in economic, scientific and 
technological progress, offering a guiding 
light for the Islamic world while engaging 
in constructive interaction with the interna-
tional community.2
 This review intends to examine the 
performance of the Fourth Plan against 
the backdrop of its major socioeconomic 
objectives.  The analysis will be limited 
to the outcome of the plan itself and does 
not deal with the totality of events, actions 
or circumstances in the Islamic Republic 
during the period.  Discussion will also 
be limited to the areas for which data are 
available — with a reminder that at no 
time since the 1979 revolution have official 
economic statistics been so scarce, incon-
sistent, doctored or deliberately withheld 
by the responsible authorities.3 Wide dif-
ferences in published facts and figures also 
exist among various government agencies, 
lending much doubt to their accuracy.4  
The Framework
 The statute mandating the Fourth Plan 
was approved by the Majlis (the national 
assembly) on January 25, 2005, to go into 
effect on March 21.  The plan’s 52 major 
objectives in four chapters included almost 
every coveted national aspiration under 
the sun:  cultural, scientific and techno-
logical affairs; social, political, defense 
and security topics; foreign political and 
diplomatic relations; and major economic 
imperatives.  Each category enumerated 
its own specific goals.
 In the economic arena, which is the 
focus of this review, the plan set a large 
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number of concrete and specific goals.  
At the top were (1) rapid and sustained 
economic growth, job creation and reduced 
unemployment; (2) curbed inflation and 
reduced income gaps among various social 
strata; (3) economic diversification along 
with increases in human capital,  technol-
ogy and total-factor productivity; (4) self-
sufficiency in basic agricultural products; 
(5) enhanced international competitiveness 
and increased non-oil exports; (6) bud-
getary reforms and reduced reliance on 
crude-oil exports; (7) privatization of state 
enterprises and their transfer to the private 
sector; (8) stabilization of the climate for 
domestic trade and business; (9) provi-
sion of housing for low-income and rural 
groups; and (10) attention to the supply, 
maintenance and use of water resources.  
 The plan’s six sections and 15 chapters 
contained 161 articles dealing with such 
varied topics as (a) high national economic 
growth in conjunction with the global 
economy; (b) environmental protection 
and regional balance; (c) enhancement 
of life quality, human security and social 
justice; (d) preservation of the nation’s 
Iranian/Islamic identity; (e) enhancement 
of national security and space exploration; 
and (f) reinvention of the government and 
improvement of public services.  There 
were upwards of 1,000 specific obliga-
tions on the part of government agencies.  
A final section presented nine quantitative 
tables involving specific targets in various 
areas.  Targeted figures in each table were 
based on certain specific assumptions.
 In quantitative terms, the plan project-
ed the following concrete targets:
• Population growth shall be limited to 1.4 
percent a year.
• Labor, capital and total-factor productivi-
ty shall rise by 3.5 percent, 1 percent, and 
2.5 percent, respectively, every year.
• Liquidity expansion shall be limited to an 
annual average of 20 percent.
• Aggregate domestic investment shall rise 
by 12.2 percent a year, and its share of 
GDP shall rise from 27.7 percent to 34.7 
percent.
• The foreign-direct-investment ratio to 
GDP shall grow from 0.6 percent to 3 
percent by 2010.
• The foreign-exchange value of the Ira-
nian rial shall be adjusted in line with the 
difference between domestic and foreign 
inflation.
• Internal revenue from taxes shall reach 8 
percent of GDP by 2010.
• Current annual government expenditures 
shall rise by no more than 10 percent in 
nominal terms.
• The government’s current annual budget 
shall be increasingly financed from non-
oil sources.
• Annual budgetary appropriation for 
research shall reach 2.5 percent of GDP 
by 2010.  
 Based on these presuppositions, the 
plan promises the following outcomes dur-
ing the 2005-10 period:
• An average annual real GDP growth of 8 
percent;
• An average annual real per capita income 
rise of 6.6 percent;
• An average annual decline in unemploy-
ment by 4.2 percent, with the jobless rate 
cut by March 2010 to 8.4 percent;
• The average annual inflation rate reduced 
to 9.9 percent, and to 8.6 percent by 
March 2010;
• The ratio between the expenditures of the 
wealthiest 10 percent of families and the 
poorest 10 percent reduced from 17 to 14;
• The Gini coefficient of income disparity 
reduced to 0.38;
• The percentage of the population below 
116
Middle east Policy, Vol. XVii, No. 4, WiNter 2010
been reduced, and there were three times 
as many patents on inventions.  Finally, 
he boasted that tens of large projects are 
inaugurated every day, and $7-$8 billion 
in new oil and gas contracts concluded 
every three months.6  He offered no proof 
for these claims, and no one in the private 
sector or elsewhere took them seriously.
 There has been no further official 
report pertaining to the Fourth Plan. A 
tentative appraisal, based on both par-
tial official data and private estimates, is 
thus ventured here.  The accompanying 
table shows numerical targets of the plan 
and their estimated realization.  A more 
detailed discussion of the goals and their 
realization follows.
From Bad To worse
 As can be readily seen from the table 
(on p. 117) and will be further elaborated 
below, none of the main targets of the plan, 
with the arguable exception of non-oil ex-
ports, have been reached — in many cases 
not even approached.
economic Growth
 The plan’s realized annual economic 
growth has been one of its most disap-
pointing outcomes.  Based on a projected 
crude-oil price of $20 a barrel, with total 
oil and gas receipts of $120 billion, the 
economy was expected to grow at an aver-
age yearly rate of 8 percent.  Yet, despite 
an actual average oil price of  $68.80/bbl 
over the five-year period and a whopping 
$340 billion in oil and gas export receipts, 
the annual growth rate over the five-year 
period is estimated to have been no more 
than 4.3 percent.7  Stranger still, the yearly 
growth rate, which was to accelerate in 
the last two years of the plan, actually 
declined!8  In fact, toward the plan’s end, 
a combination of structural weaknesses, 
the relative poverty line brought down to 
7 percent;
• An average annual increase in non-oil 
exports by 10.7 percent;
• The ratio of national budget to GDP 
reduced to 10 percent; 
• The total number of government employ-
ees reduced by 5 percent.
resulTs
 Despite the government’s obligation 
to submit annual and final reports of the 
plan’s implementation to the Majlis, only 
one, for the year 2006, was issued.  In a 
speech in late December 2008, President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gave a brief 
account of his three-and-a-half-year-old 
administration without reference to the 
plan.  After accusing his critics of having 
concocted “40,000 lies” about his govern-
ment’s performance,5 he cited a number 
of accomplishments on his watch.  He 
claimed that GDP had grown 7 percent a 
year, thanks to four times as many devel-
opment projects initiated each year and 
substantial increases in steel, cement, 
aluminum, coal, oil and gas production.  
Based on these investments, he claimed, 
unemployment had been cut from 12.9 per-
cent to less than 10 percent, income gaps 
among various strata had been reduced, 
and the Gini coefficient had improved.  In 
the first three years of his stewardship, he 
continued, the rural sector had enjoyed 
vastly more natural-gas connections, 
drinking-water supplies, paved roads, 
health care and insurance, and ten times as 
many housing renovations.  In other areas, 
he added, privatization had expanded ten 
times faster than before.  More “justice 
shares” had been distributed among the 
poor, and government employees had been 
reduced.  Furthermore, he mentioned, non-
oil exports had tripled, foreign debt had 
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target, the 8 percent annual growth antici-
pated in the Fourth Plan was clearly overly 
ambitious.  The 8 percent target required 
at least a half-trillion dollars of aggregate 
investment during the five-year period, 
which was clearly nowhere to be found. 
Furthermore, public investment priorities 
given to politically inspired projects (e.g., 
nuclear-energy enrichment, military hard-
ware, space exploration, foreign adven-
tures) or allocated to low-return undertak-
ings (e.g., unprofitable airports, water-short 
dams, low-traffic highways and aid to 
resource misallocations and a worsening 
business climate produced stagflation — 
a simultaneous state of low growth and 
high unemployment. The situation, com-
monly referred to as the Dutch disease, 
was characterized by reduced international 
competitive ability, anemic growth and 
higher prices of land, housing and other 
non-tradable items.  
 To be sure, given the mere 3.9 percent 
rate of average real growth during the 
1991-2001 period and the Third Plan’s 
inability to reach its anticipated growth 
FourTh Plan:  TarGeTs and PerFormance, 2005-2010
1991-2001 Target Actual
Record 1  5-year Avg. March 2010 5-year Avg. March 2010
GdP1 3.9 8.0 9.3 4.3
Per capita GDP 2.4 6.6 2.8
unemployment1 4.7       -4.2 8.4       11.2 14.6
Inflation1 2.3 9.9 8.6       15.8 10.8
Productivity1
Capital … 1.0 …        -1.3 …
Labor                              1.3      3.5 …         0.76 …
Total Factor … 2.5 …        -0.16 …
Investment:
Domestic1, 3 4.3       12.2 … 5.9 …
     Foreign3 … 3.0 …         0.075 …
exports:
Oil & Gas ² …     120.0 …     340.0
Non-oil Exports1 5.6       10.7 …       15.6 …
Non-oil Exports² …       53.0 …       78.0 …
Imports² …     185.0     284.0 …
Population1 1.5 1.4         1.48 …
liquidity1       27.3       20.0 …       28.0 …
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Iran Statistics Center, official releases, and author’s estimates.
1 Annual average percentage change during the period
2 Billions of U.S. dollars, 2004/5 – 2009/10
3 As percentage share of GDP
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continue their education at state universi-
ties (at zero opportunity cost) in the hope 
of finding better chances at a later date.13
 Widely regarded as the regime’s 
Achilles’ heel, job creation was the special 
focus of the planners.  They envisaged the 
creation of more than 900,000 jobs each 
year, for a total of 4.8 million, hoping 
to bring the unemployment rate to 8.4 
percent by March 2010.  However, even 
the disputed low-double-digit official 
unemployment rate of 11.9 percent in 
March 2010 was still far above the target 
of 8.4 percent.  Loans to the so-called 
“quick-return projects” were initially the 
administration’s principal way of stimulat-
ing job creation. Improved distribution 
of credit and higher non-oil exports were 
other means.   Appearing before the Majlis 
in mid-August 2010, the minister of labor 
and social affairs testified that during 
the plan period, some $21.5 billion were 
lent to these enterprises, and more than 
968,000 jobs were created. A protesting 
deputy member, however, pointed out that 
the employment target for these ventures 
had been 3 million, more than three times 
the realized figure. Furthermore, some 70 
percent of the loans were given to already 
self-employed borrowers; thus, no more 
than 300,000-400,000 new jobs — an 
average of two additional workers per unit 
— were actually created. He also referred 
to reports by the Central Bank and the Na-
tional Inspection Organization regarding 
flagrant deviations by the borrowing enter-
prises from their stated proposals.14  Still 
further, he noted that more than 300,000 
of these small businesses were on the 
verge of bankruptcy, needing additional 
government assistance. 15 Another opposi-
tion deputy pointed out that that borrow-
ing enterprises have been able to pay back 
only 10 percent of their loans so far.16
depressed regions) played a crucial part in 
the overall outcome. Still further, modern 
technological improvements in agriculture, 
competitive new industries, efficient public 
transportation and environmental protec-
tion were badly neglected. 
employment
 High employment also proved to be 
an elusive goal.  Although national un-
employment data released by the Iran 
Statistics Center, the Ministry of Labor, 
informal workers’ associations and private 
analysts do not match up, all estimates 
point to a double-digit range during the 
entire plan period. Official data show that 
the annual jobless rate gradually declined 
from 11.5 percent in 2005 to 10.4 percent 
in 2008, before rising to 11.9 percent in 
2009 and higher in early 2010.  Private 
estimates indicate an increase from 14.7 
percent in 2005 to 16 percent in 2007 
before declining to 14.6 percent in 2010. 
The official national average also reflects 
single-digit (7-8 percent) unemployment 
in some provinces and 27-28 percent in 
others.9 The rate for ages 15-24 shows 23.3 
percent in 2005 and 29.6 percent in 2010.10 
The labor news agency ILNA places the 
end-year figure at 18 percent.11  A former 
Iranian employers’ representative to the 
International Labor Organization points to 
a national jobless rate in 2009 of more than 
22 percent, and in some provinces more 
than 45 percent.12  Apart from widespread 
suspicion of deliberate data manipulation, 
the most obvious reason for the differences 
between official and private estimates is 
the fact that the Ministry of Labor counts 
military draftees, housewives, students 
and those who work for one or two hours 
a week as “employed.” At the same time, a 
large number of job seekers have evidently 
stopped looking for work or decided to 
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8 percent real annual GDP growth was to 
be realized from increases in total-factor 
productivity and 5.5 percent from new 
investments.  Yet, according to the direc-
tor of Iran’s Productivity Society, during 
the first three years of the plan, only 1 
percent of growth could be attributed to 
such improvements.21  The five-year figure, 
according to private estimates, shows only 
a minuscule increase in labor productivity 
and negative figures for both capital and 
total factor. Suggested reasons for the low 
labor figure include inadequate employee 
qualifications, lack of personal interest 
and enthusiasm, acceptance of positions 
simply to earn income rather than be useful 
or creative, lack of sufficient job security, 
and the absence of job supervision. Ac-
cording to one estimate, there has been 
only one hour of productive work out of 
the daily eight in both government and 
private occupations.22  Suspected culprits 
for negative figures in the case of capital 
and total-factor productivity may be found 
in the mismatching of formal education 
and national economic needs,23 inadequate 
training, use of antiquated technology, 
poor selection of projects, and diversion of 
research into non-civilian activities.   
Investment
 The behavior of aggregate investment 
has also been among the least successful of 
the plan targets.  Its woefully small amount 
has been the principal source of slow 
growth, high unemployment and double-
digit inflation. Under the plan, investment 
growth was to average 12.8 percent a year 
in real terms and reach nearly 35 percent of 
GDP.  Actually, the annual rate, except for 
the year 2005, seldom exceeded 7 percent, 
and the five-year average came to only 6 
percent.  A number of economic factors are 
cited as the main impediments:  declining 
 While the jobless numbers cited by 
the authorities widely differ from private 
estimates, the fact remains that, by the 
end of the period, an estimated 3.5-5 mil-
lion people — the largest number in the 
country’s post-revolution history — were 
out of work. Three-quarters of a million 
among the unemployed were reportedly 
farm workers who had lost their jobs due 
to reduced government support, credit 
shortages, excessive agricultural imports 
and increased mechanization.17
Inflation
 The plan’s record in taming inflation 
has been somewhat better.  The official 
consumer price index at President Ah-
madinejad’s inauguration in June 2005 
was 11.1 percent. A series of expansion-
ary fiscal and monetary policies pursued 
under the new president’s direction during 
2005-07 pushed the index to 25 percent 
in September 2008.  Thereafter, due to a 
reduction in annual liquidity growth from 
40 percent a year to 16 percent by 2008, 
a severe tightening of credit policy by the 
Central Bank, and the global financial 
crisis, the index began to decline.  The 
official consumer price index in March 
2010 is given as 10.8 percent.18  Private 
estimates place the figure at 20.5 percent.19  
The average official annual rate during 
the plan came down to 15.8 percent — far 
above the target.  Private estimates show 
upward of 22 percent. In any case, despite 
official pride in combating inflation, Iran’s 
rank in 2010 among 222 countries and 
territories was 216, with only six having a 
higher rate.20
Productivity
 Failure to enhance productivity has 
been another disappointment. According to 
the plan, some 2.5 percent of the projected 
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improved. Most private analysts differ.  
Measured by three standard criteria — 
changes in family expenditures relative to 
income, the expenditure ratio of the top 
10 percent of the population to the bottom 
10, and trends in the Gini coefficient — it 
is widely believed that poverty has actu-
ally increased and income distribution 
worsened.  Based on official data, both 
urban and rural family expenditures went 
up during 2005-10, while income did not 
keep pace.29  Data released by the Central 
Bank also show that the Gini coefficient 
steadily deteriorated, from 0.3996 in 
2004/5 to 0.4045 in 2007/8. At the same 
time, the ratio of the top 10 percent of 
income recipients’ expenditures to those 
of the bottom decile rose from 14.6 to 15.9 
during the same period.30  Contrasting 
these reports,  the government’s data base 
claims that in the plan’s last  year, the Gini 
coefficient has declined to 0.3859, and the 
ratio of top-to-bottom income recipients 
decreased to 13.5 times.31  Estimates by the 
World Bank and Iran’s own Central Bank 
for different plan years show that between 
8 percent and 19 percent of the total popu-
lation fall below various poverty lines.32  
The opposition press puts the absolute 
poor between 29 and 32.5 percent, or 20 
million.33 In short, there is no indication 
that the plan’s goal of 7 percent poverty 
reduction has been reached.  Moreover 
an interesting phenomenon in the Iranian 
case is that some 67 percent of urban and 
52 percent of rural families categorized as 
poor were headed by an employed person.  
Low wages rather than joblessness were 
the apparent cause.34   
Foreign Exchange
 The foreign exchange value of the 
Iranian rial, which had to be adjusted in 
line with “the gap between domestic and 
capital returns due to reduced international 
competitiveness, profitability of short-term 
trade and stock-market speculation, dif-
ficulties of domestic investment financing 
due to the banking system’s capital inad-
equacy and huge non-performing assets,24 
greater investment opportunities offshore, 
and ever-changing government regula-
tions.  Increased inroads by the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps into lucrative 
public projects — infrastructure, oil and 
gas, telecommunications and others — on 
special non-competitive government con-
tracts also tended to discourage domestic 
participation by private investors.25 For-
eign direct investments that were expected 
to reach 3 percent of GDP by 2010 were 
no more than a small fraction of the target.  
The estimated total for the period of less 
than $9 billion never even approached the 
goal, due mainly to a deteriorating busi-
ness climate, foreign sanctions and as-
sorted bureaucratic red tape.26  At the same 
time, there have been widespread reports 
of as much as $3.5 billion in capital flight 
per year.27 And Iran’s own foreign joint 
ventures in the Persian Gulf region and 
Latin America are reported to have reached 
$800 million.28
reducing Poverty
 The plan’s success in reducing poverty 
and improving domestic income distribu-
tion is highly disputed and controversial. 
The extent of poverty in the country is still 
subject to extensive debate.  The minister 
of welfare and social security in charge 
of poverty eradication has repeatedly 
refused to divulge the numbers, arguing 
that such information is useless and of no 
significance. President Ahmadinejad and 
a small coterie of his associates claim that 
there is now no “absolute poverty” in Iran 
and that domestic income distribution has 
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direct investments.  Furthermore, it is esti-
mated that each $1 billion of extra imports 
threw out an estimated 100,000 work-
ers and raised the country’s dependence 
on food imports. Incentives for steadily 
increasing imports (on top of the highly 
overvalued exchange rate) were such fac-
tors as high domestic inflation, low indus-
trial and farm productivity, and the profit-
ability of out-sourcing, whereby domestic 
companies shifted all or a major part of 
their production to lower-wage or cheaper-
exchange-rate countries (like China) and 
limited their domestic value-added to local 
packaging and trademarking.37 
non-oil exports
 The performance of non-oil exports, 
at first glance, has been the brightest spot 
in the plan.  The share of these exports 
in Iran’s total annual foreign sales was 
targeted to rise 10.7 percent annually and 
to reach $52.8 billion (33.6 percent of 
total exports) by 2010.  Actually, the total 
for the period amounted to $78 billion, 
having increased at 15.6 percent a year.  
Due to a spectacular rise in oil and gas 
exports, however, the 33.6 percent target 
was missed; the outcome was only 18.5 
percent.  Furthermore, nearly 45 percent of 
the “non-oil” exports normally consisted 
of petrochemicals and other gas-based 
condensates.38  And the ratio of non-oil 
exports to GDP, which was expected to be 
10 percent, reached only 4.8 percent.
 Other ancillary objectives of the plan 
also generally missed their targets. A Maj-
lis deputy involved in the parliamentary 
investigation of the plan’s performance 
points to a 30 percent  deviation from 
overall targets and 80-100 percent failures 
in certain cases.39 While concrete data for 
the quantitative evaluation of these targets 
are not available, scattered officials and 
foreign inflation” was not acted upon.  As 
it turned out, while the official domestic 
consumer price index during the five-
year period rose by nearly 80 percent 
(compared with 15-20 percent for Iran’s 
major trade partners), the average annual 
rial/dollar value went up by less than 11 
percent — from Rls. 9026=$1 in 2005 to 
RLs. 1040=$1 in 2010. The actual mis-
alignment was even greater, since official 
inflation figures normally underestimated 
the true price changes in the market, and 
the initial exchange rate was also not in 
equilibrium.  By a rudimentary calcula-
tion, the exchange value of the U.S. dollar 
in March 2010 should have been between 
Rls. 22,000 and 24,000 instead of hovering 
around Rls. 10,000. 
 The results of this significant real 
over-valuation have been a severe blow to 
domestic producers in their competition 
with foreign rivals and a hefty subsidy 
to foreign farmers and manufacturers. 
Iran’s relatively cheap foreign exchange 
has pushed imports during the five-year 
period to $284 billions:  2.8 times that of 
the Third Plan, and 53 percent larger than 
the planned target.  Of greater significance 
is the fact that imports of consumer items 
were 36 percent larger, and capital goods 
49 percent smaller, than in the previous 
plan.35  In addition to legitimate imports, 
authorities confiscated an estimated $20 
billion worth of smuggled goods in 2009, 
up from $13 billion in 2007-08 and $6 
billion in 2004-05.36  The imports, while 
helping to rein in galloping inflation, suc-
cessfully competed against domestically 
produced goods and lowered production 
in a large number of local industries to 
only 30 to 40 percent of capacity. Other 
clear consequences of the massive imports 
were a worsening of Iran’s non-oil trade 
balance, capital flight and reduced foreign 
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searchInG For clues
 The unflattering performance of the 
Fourth Plan has, to a large extent, been a 
predictable outcome of its own unrealis-
tic assumptions, inadequate input/output 
calculations, and overly ambitious targets. 
Nevertheless, the Ahmadinejad govern-
ment’s share in ignoring the plan’s man-
dates and disregarding its provisions can 
by no means be ignored or belittled. It is 
true that the Fourth Plan was prepared and 
approved during the Khatami administra-
tion, and the document was placed at the 
new president’s door without his involve-
ment or input. But he not only refused to 
endorse the plan’s directives, he actually 
undermined its operation through a series 
of countermeasures.  A stunning manifes-
tation of this lack of interest, if not actual 
opposition, was the abrupt closing of the 
60-year-old government Plan Organiza-
tion in charge of Iran’s five-year planning 
and the annexation of its operation to the 
president’s executive office. 
 The overall blame for the plan’s sub-
par accomplishments, however, must be 
shared by (1) Ahmadinejad’s own belief 
system and leadership style; (2) the poor 
qualifications of his economic team; and 
(3) the worsening climate for investment 
and productive activities during the period.
The President’s role
 An explanation for the plan’s disap-
pointing performance — and its identifica-
tion as the least successful of the Islamic 
Republic’s post-revolution planning — 
points to the president’s own complex 
persona, his messianic ideology, quixotic 
behavior, provocative statements and blunt 
language.44  The totality of these traits has 
been largely responsible for blunting his 
authority at home and damaging Iran’s 
position and prestige in the world, thus 
private reports offer the following clues:  
• The ratio of taxes to GDP, which was to 
reach 8 percent in the fifth year, was stuck 
at less than 7 percent.
• The budget’s reliance on oil-export re-
ceipts for current expenditures, which was 
to be gradually reduced, actually rose.40
• Despite the mandate requiring the 
government to eliminate its debt to the 
banking system by 2010, its obligations 
actually increased.
• While a state spokesman claims that total 
government employees had been cut by 
160,000 (7.9 percent),41 private analysts 
show increases in total figures.
• The plan’s mandate regarding the Oil 
Reserve Fund’s replenishment and 
drawdown cannot be evaluated since the 
government protects the fund’s balances 
as state secrets. Various unofficial figures 
mentioned by Majlis deputies indicated a 
balance of less than $10 billion in March 
2010.  Had the government met the plan’s 
mandate for depositing extra annual oil-
export income in the fund, the balance 
should have been more than $100 billion.
• The plan’s requirement for gradual up-
ward annual price adjustments of subsi-
dized products was totally scuttled by the 
sixth Majlis.
• The objective of accelerated privatization 
was not achieved.  Some 50 percent of the 
$70 billion in privatized assets of 330 state 
enterprises during the five-year period 
consisted of the distribution of “justice 
shares” among poorer strata.42 Another 25 
percent was ceded to government agencies 
(the Social Security Fund and the Pension 
Fund) in lieu of delayed government bud-
getary contributions.  Only 13.5 percent 
was sold to the private sector, through the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. And more than 75 
percent of the management of the ceded 
enterprises remained in state hands.43
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economy and moral relativism” has a “dark 
future.”46  In a long and abstruse discourse 
at a privatization conference in Tehran, he 
said:  “Western materialistic and capitalist 
economic science — based on individual-
ism, unfettered competition and pursuit of 
profit — is at a dead end, since it is condu-
cive to widening income gaps and social 
conflicts. We, in the Islamic Republic, are 
bent on establishing a unique Iranian/Is-
lamic and moral-based economics devoted 
to the uplifting of human personality, in-
stead of creating an economic man.”47 With 
such ideas, and as a fervent anti-Western, 
anti-capitalist and anti-liberal ideologue, 
he was thus fundamentally opposed to the 
Fourth Plan, prepared by Western-trained 
economists, as alien and un-Islamic. The 
clearest reflection of this posture is his 
first vice-president’s statement calling the 
plan document “a liberal scheme based on 
humanistic ideals” and not even “worth 
recycling its paper.”48  
 Ahmadinejad’s singular behavior — 
denouncing Western foibles at internation-
al gatherings, writing repeated letters to 
world leaders without receiving answers, 
inviting American Presidents Bush and 
Obama to face-to-face televised debates, 
and advising various heads of state on how 
to govern their countries — has made him 
the laughing stock of American late-night 
comedy shows and a prominent subject of 
ridicule in the Western media.  He’s the 
first Iranian president in the 32-year histo-
ry of the Islamic Republic to congratulate 
an American head of state on his success-
ful election.  His message to President-
elect Barack Obama, however, consisted 
mostly of a pedantic lecture about nec-
essary changes in U.S. foreign policy.  
Platitudes such as the primacy of “public 
interests and justice” over “the never-
ending demands of a selfish minority,” the 
undermining the plan’s overall chances for 
success.
 Mahmood Ahmadinejad is often de-
scribed as a sui generis phenomenon. Yet 
he is no enigma.  He is an ambitious politi-
cian with a mammoth ego characteristic of 
successful people of humble origins trying 
to be regarded as important global players. 
He is also obstinate, excitable and intran-
sigent, eager to pick a political fight for 
his “cause.”  He has reviled and discred-
ited his domestic political rivals, mocked 
everyone in the secular and religious 
establishments who disagreed with him, 
and disparaged foreign leaders and govern-
ments that did not support his policies.45  
Even some of his supporters accuse him 
of being exclusive, dismissive of friendly 
advice, and unduly reliant on a small circle 
of relatives and trusted comrades-in-arms.  
No Iranian president in the 32-year his-
tory of the Islamic Republic has been so 
widely criticized at home or so savagely 
vilified abroad.  No other has faced so 
much difficulty in obtaining a Majlis’ vote 
of confidence for his cabinet choices or so 
many obstacles in garnering approval for 
his bills, despite the fact that a majority of 
the assembly members, called “principal-
ists,” have been his camp followers.  He 
has been chastised and overridden by the 
supreme leader (his staunchest supporter) 
more times than any other government 
office holder.  Even some of his foreign 
colleagues and friends, like Cuba’s Fidel 
Castro and Brazil’s Lula da Silva, have 
chastised him for his anti-Semitism. 
 As an Islamic ideologue and absolutist, 
Ahmadinejad considers the current world 
order oppressive and unjust, the West’s 
wealth and power based on its pillaging 
poor nations and usurping their livelihoods. 
In his view, “Western society, domi-
nated by liberal democracy, a free-market 
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he called it the manifestation of “cowboy 
logic.”52 Then, addressing the Council in 
obvious anger, he said, “Go issue as many 
sanctions resolutions as you can until 
weeds start growing under your feet;” and 
“go impose as many sanctions as you want 
until your sanctions-issuing capacity ex-
plodes” (a tasteless equivalent of “till hell 
freezes over”). In every subsequent actual 
or implied sanctions threat, he has uttered 
similar nasty words.  
 At an OPEC summit in mid-2008, 
calling the U.S. dollar “a worthless piece 
of paper,” 53 he announced Iran’s switch to 
the euro and asked other OPEC members 
to demand euros instead of dollars for 
their crude-oil sales, declaring the propos-
al “a revolution in oil relations.”  While 
the proposal brought no favorable reaction 
from other delegates, he ordered Iran’s 
Central Bank to change its dollar reserves 
into euros, and asked Iran’s oil customers 
to pay in euros instead of the customary 
dollar.  Two years later, on May 31, 2010, 
due to a decline in the euro against the 
U.S. dollar, the Central Bank began to 
gradually convert some of its exchange 
reserves back into gold and dollars.54 As 
a result of the two shifts, the bank report-
edly took a hefty loss.
 Ahmadinejad’s frequent speeches 
— consisting mainly of screeds against 
Western imperialism, global capitalism, Is-
rael and Zionism, and jingoistic talk about 
Iran’s becoming “a real and true super-
power”55 — make headlines daily in Iran 
and are often reported in the world media.  
Turning facts on their head, in mid-No-
vember 2008, he claimed that the people of 
Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini were instru-
mental in the breakdown of the former 
Soviet Union. Then he added, “I give you 
the great news that the second part of the 
world’s bipolar structure (i.e., the United 
need to replace “militarism, occupation, 
bullying and discrimination” with “justice, 
friendship and non-interference in other 
countries’ affairs,” and, finally, the neces-
sity of “changes in American policy and 
conduct” filled the rest. The letter’s subtext 
was that the Islamic Republic expected the 
new president to undo the Bush “evils,” 
adopt a new stance, and treat Iran with due 
respect and equality.49 Later on, responding 
to President Obama’s “outstreatched hand 
for his unclenched fist,” he laid out the pre-
conditions for talks with the new adminis-
tration as follows: the U.S. president must 
apologize and compensate for America’s 
“past crimes” against the Islamic Republic; 
withdraw U.S. forces from overseas and 
refrain from interfering in other nations’ 
affairs in order to prove his pledge of 
“change” — and stop supporting Israel.50 
 Another manifestation of his inconsis-
tent behavior has been his attitude toward 
the United Nations.  After repeatedly 
castigating the UN Security Council as un-
just, illegitimate and under Washington’s 
thumb, he sought Iran’s membership in 
the Council for the 2009-10 term, claim-
ing that the Islamic Republic had the full 
support of the 118 members of the Non-
Aligned Movement for the position.  The 
result was somewhat humiliating, as only 
32 nations (17 percent) supported the Is-
lamic Republic’s candidacy, and 158 mem-
bers voted for Japan.  Again, while having 
repeatedly called the Security Council 
sanctions “illegal, ineffective and a used 
paper towel to be thrown into the waste 
basket,”51 he launched a concerted effort 
to stop a fourth round of sanctions in early 
June 2010 through personal travels and 
promises of financial aid to non-permanent 
members of the Council.  But, once the 
fourth UN resolution was passed by a 
clear majority of the 15-member board, 
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Global Attitudes also found Iran among the 
world most negatively viewed countries.”64 
 Ahmadinejad’s use of derogatory 
Persian words, expressions and slogans has 
also been a cause of great embarrassment 
to his educated supporters and heaven-sent 
manna to his critics. Although capable 
of using more refined language, he often 
resorts to what a literary critic has char-
acterized as “ impolite, rude, vulgar and 
insulting” — the type of language used 
by the “lumpen proletariat, red-necks and 
bullies.”65  It was for one such utterance 
that Iran’s judiciary chief admonished him 
to use more “sober, dignified and fair” lan-
guage.”66 This manner of speaking, how-
ever, in most experts’ opinion, has been 
deliberately used to show his solidarity 
with the oppressed and the disenfranchised 
“wretched of the earth.” 
 Unpredictable and controversial 
behavior, bizarre statements, wild claims, 
crude proposals and politically incorrect 
language have kept Ahmadinejad in the 
global limelight and doubtless immensely 
satisfied him as a showman. His tough-
talking style against the arrogant and afflu-
ent West has also made him a hero in the 
poorer quarters of Cairo, Kabul, Islamabad 
and Jakarta. Yet almost everywhere else in 
the global community he has been per-
ceived as irrational, unstable and an unfit 
interlocutor.  His inflammatory statements 
have also discredited Iran and its govern-
ment and worked against the country’s 
national interest.  By squandering Iran’s 
legitimate prestige on empty hyperbole, 
he also caused irreparable damage to the 
plan’s chances for success.
The Team’s Share
 Part of the blame for the Fourth Plan’s 
poor results is also attributable to the 
president’s cabinet ministers, assistants 
States) will also crumble soon due to 
Iran’s challenge.”56 His belief in Iranian 
exceptionalism led him to tell a sympa-
thetic audience in Kerman during his 2008 
countrywide tour: “Today Iran is the most 
glorious, most beloved and most powerful 
nation on earth,” and “all global equations 
are influenced by Iran’s decision.”57 In a 
speech before the Islamic World Publish-
ers in mid-summer 2010, he said: “We in 
Iran are not out to save the world of Islam; 
we want to rescue the entire humanity.”58  
Giving his fanciful speeches an air of 
vacuity and even farce, he said in a speech 
at a Tehran seminar: “Currently, Iran is, 
without a doubt, the most powerful and 
important nation on earth” and has the 
final say on world affairs.59  Branding his 
own disputed June 2009 re-election as “the 
harbinger of a global revolution,” he called 
on the Islamic Republic “to launch its uni-
versal mission.”60  The final irony was that, 
while Iran’s own Fourth Plan had failed 
to accomplish any of its major objectives 
by the fourth year of implementation, he 
boasted that Iran is “the only country with 
the potential and the talent to introduce 
a new economic model based on justice 
and humane values to solve the world’s 
economic crisis.”61
 The president’s claims about the Islam-
ic Republic’s global power and popularity 
proved fanciful when a 2008 poll conduct-
ed by Aljazeera Television of more than 
27,000 viewers indicated that 90 percent 
of Arabs considered the Islamic Republic 
their enemy.62  Another poll by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation in early 2009, 
involving nearly 14,000 individuals in 24 
countries, showed that some 56 percent of 
respondents regarded the Islamic Republic 
as “the number-one country with a nega-
tive influence on world affairs.”63  Similar 
polls by World Public Opinion and Pew 
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other problems, the government’s funda-
mentalist ideology; simplistic assumptions 
about the economy; preference for trial and 
error instead of careful preparations; priori-
tizing loyalty over expertise, emotion over 
rationality and perception over reality; con-
verting serious goals into populist slogans; 
treating leaders’ preferences as popular 
wishes; rejecting expert advice; neglecting 
entrepreneurship and creative thinking in fa-
vor of imitation; de-emphasizing the rule of 
law; and causing  a widening gulf between 
people and government.69
 These socioeconomic shortcomings 
coincided with the most  politically tense 
period in the Islamic Republic’s peacetime 
history. The crisis-ridden atmosphere was 
in part home-grown and in part externally 
based. At home, President Ahmadinejad, 
strongly supported by the security and 
military forces and frequently backed by 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, was embold-
ened to pursue a maverick dictatorial lead-
ership style.  He repeatedly quarreled with 
the Majlis and its speaker on such issues 
as enforcement of the assembly’s statutes, 
reform of consumer subsidies, financing 
of the Tehran metro, arbitrary closing of 
various national councils, observance of 
daylight-saving time, the status of Azad 
University and the number of national hol-
idays.70  Even some of his supporters in the 
Majlis accused him of ignoring or evading 
the laws.71  Others hinted at a possible im-
peachment motion against him. He refused 
to attend the Expediency Council’s ses-
sions ex-officio because of his differences 
with ex-president Rafsanjani, its chair-
man.  He angered the powerful ayatollahs 
and the clerical establishment in Qom 
over some of his appointments as well as 
the enforcement of certain tenets of the 
Islamic moral code (e.g., men shaving their 
beards or wearing ties, women attending 
and advisers. Ahmadinejad’s unsophis-
ticated, dictatorial and crass demeanor 
have made it difficult for him to work with 
people outside his own circle of friends 
and cronies. The president’s team, in turn, 
has been widely regarded as mediocre, 
inept, unqualified and worse.67  Ahmadine-
jad, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
commander himself, has replaced the 
large segment of Iran’s technocracy that 
was nurtured under the stewardship of 
Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami with 
his former comrades from the military and 
security forces. As many as 14 of the 21 
members of his cabinet had been guard 
officers at one time or another.  Nearly the 
entire cadre of well-trained and world-
savvy technocrats familiar with global 
strategic, political and economic affairs 
has been prematurely retired, dismissed, 
imprisoned, silenced or enticed to leave 
the country. Their replacements have fre-
quently lacked sufficient expertise in their 
fields. Some have had tarnished financial 
reputations. Two or three turned out to 
have falsified their educational qualifica-
tions. And they all have been imbued with 
an early post-revolutionary mentality ill-
suited for twenty-first century tasks.  These 
deficiencies have caused one-fourth of all 
Ahmadinejad’s nominees to be rejected 
by the Majlis at one time or another; nine 
of his 21-member cabinet were replaced.68  
Some were impeached or dismissed; others 
resigned out of frustration, blaming the 
president for their failings.
Inhospitable Business Climate
 A lengthy report by a group of univer-
sity economists, addressed to the president 
and the Majlis in October 2008, thoroughly 
dissected and analyzed the administration’s 
responsibility for the Fourth Plan’s poor per-
formance.  The report underscored, among 
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the UN Security Council. Invoking its 
sovereign rights under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Islamic 
Republic insisted on being able to enrich 
and stockpile uranium at home for its 
future energy needs.74  Failing to convince 
the international community of its peace-
ful intentions during the plan’s life, Iran 
was slapped with three consecutive UNSC 
sanctions resolutions — in 2006, 2007 and 
2008 — to curb its program.  By making 
uranium enrichment an issue of national 
independence, honor and prestige, the ad-
ministration contributed to Iran’s increas-
ing isolation and alienation. Accused of 
helping certain anti-Israeli groups in the 
Middle East, Tehran was also labeled by 
the United States the number-one state 
sponsor of terrorism and was further uni-
laterally sanctioned in several other ways.    
 The pernicious atmosphere of radi-
cal confrontation with the West resulted 
in a shift of trade and investment from 
traditional partners in Europe and North 
America toward less lucrative sources and 
lower-quality products and technologies in 
East Asia and a group of radical anti-West-
erners in Latin America and Africa.  Overt 
quarrels and recriminations with Washing-
ton and Tel Aviv, resulting in daily rumors 
of imminent American or Israeli military 
attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, created 
a dysfunctional economic environment of 
uncertainty and fear hardly conducive to 
long-term business activity. The inhospi-
table climate, in turn, discouraged produc-
tive economic activity and investment at 
home and encouraged capital flight. Funds 
were steadily diverted from long-term 
projects toward speculative short-term 
activities, gold and foreign-exchange trans-
actions, and forays into the Tehran Stock 
Exchange, whose price index rose from 
9,460 in 2005 to 12,540 in early 2009. 
sports events in Tehran stadiums).  There 
were unconcealed differences between him 
and the powerful judiciary over prosecut-
ing corruption. He angered the bazaar 
merchants and their religious offshoot, the 
Motal-e-feh party, over taxes and business 
regulations. And his open enmity towards 
his political rivals continued unabated. 
 This tension-filled political environ-
ment, where one branch of the government 
was in open conflict with the other two, 
coincided with a period of rising socio-
political tension occasionally beyond the 
president’s own wishes and control.  Re-
versing Khatami’s open-society policies, 
a movement toward further Islamization 
of Iranian society got underway, involv-
ing revisions of Iranian history, changes in 
school curricula, increased budgets for re-
ligious institutions, replacement of national 
holidays with religious ones, and similar 
faith-based policies.  A brutal crackdown 
on political dissent created a highly uncer-
tain economic climate:  wholesale closure 
of newspapers; arrest and incarceration of 
journalists, bloggers and civil-rights advo-
cates; increased harassment of civil-society 
leaders and NGOs; intensified discrimina-
tion against women;72 and massive purges 
of university professors.73 
 Also partly responsible for aggravat-
ing the crisis were external pressures 
and sanctions. During most of the Fourth 
Plan period, the Islamic Republic faced 
increasing global isolation and repeated 
worldwide sanctions due to its pursuit of 
a controversial nuclear-energy policy and 
unwavering support of the “Palestinian 
cause.”  Abandoning the Khatami admin-
istration’s policy of dialogue and coop-
eration with the West, the Ahmadinejad 
government became entangled in confron-
tation and brinkmanship with the United 
States, the European Union and ultimately 
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life of the plan, Ahmadinejad openly and 
proudly confessed to economic ignorance 
and showed an obsessive hostility towards 
the interest-based banking system.  He 
doggedly pursued certain short-term and 
populist schemes to lower interest rates in 
order to create jobs and establish “Islamic 
social justice” at the expense of planned, 
long-term projects. Thoroughly immersed 
in his messianic creed and increasingly 
convinced of his own self-righteousness, 
he found the plan to have no relevance in 
a country “guided by the Twelfth Imam.” 
It was only in the last year of the plan that 
a major restructuring of the economy — 
called the “great economic surgery,” with 
subsidy reforms as its trail blazer — was 
introduced and passed by the Majlis.77
 The absence of a clear economic strat-
egy, combined with gross mismanagement 
of the economy and aggravated by mount-
ing international censure and the implied 
threat of  military conflict, exerted multiple 
chilling effects on the economy. Washing-
ton’s repeated reminders that “all options 
are on the table” significantly reduced the 
inflow of foreign funds and new technol-
ogy needed by industry and agriculture. 
The hostile climate undermined the Iranian 
government’s own efforts to obtain financ-
ing and knowhow from normal sources and 
scared Iranian investors enough to prompt 
them to move their funds and businesses 
abroad.78 In short, the absence of economic 
security at home and the regime’s gross 
mishandling of foreign relations, combined 
with the Fourth Plan’s own inherent short-
comings, left no chance for success. 
 While Iranian government officials 
routinely claim that the UN and U.S. sanc-
tions have had no adverse impact on the 
Iranian economy, there is little doubt that, 
even if sanctions involved no actual losses, 
they certainly had plenty of potential nega-
tive consequences. On one rare occasion, 
a high oil-ministry official told the ILNA 
news agency that the costs of the coun-
try’s energy projects had doubled due to 
the difficulties in finding needed supplies, 
technology and capital — thus delaying 
the projects’ completion.75  A former direc-
tor of the National Iranian Oil Company 
has asserted that the Islamic government’s 
inability to obtain new technologies in the 
West, its lack of access to major world 
capital markets, and its failure to sell its 
own energy bonds abroad are seriously 
threatening the fate of Iran’s oil and gas 
industry.76  
a look Back     
 In retrospect, the ultimate reasons 
for the Fourth Plan’s disappointing per-
formance were not only the fact that the 
Ahmadinejad government was opposed to 
its underlying principles or that it ignored 
its mandates, but that it also had no strat-
egy of its own.  It simply drifted from one 
slogan to another without establishing a 
clear direction for action.  While opposing 
the plan’s emphasis on liberalization, price 
and wage decontrol, reliance on the free 
market and downsizing the bureaucracy, it 
chose to follow a series of ad hoc deci-
sions mixed with increasing state inter-
vention and regulation.  During the entire 
1 For the plan’s text and provisions in Persian, see Qanoon-e Barnameh-e Chaharom-e Tossee Eqtesadi, Ejte-
mai, va Farhangi-e Jomhouri-e Eslami-e Iran (Tehran: Sazeman-e Modiriyat va Barnameh, 1384 [Manage-
ment and Planning Organization, 2005).
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